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LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LA w. Edited by William Twining. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986. Pp. viii, 267. $49.95. 
Interest in legal theory is experiencing a resurgence as a result of 
debate among scholars in the traditional, Critical Legal Studies, and 
Law and Economics schools. Yet, one must wonder if these discus-
sions of legal theory will ever inform practice in basic legal fields such 
as contracts, torts, or evidence. Some effects undoubtedly will result 
as scholarly judges incorporate various legal theories in their deci-
sions, but gaps in understanding greatly handicap broad utilization of 
these theoretical debates. 
In Legal Theory and Common Law William Twining1 attempts to 
close the "gap between legal theory and particular fields of legal 
study" (p. 1). Twining asserts that both students and practitioners 
experience this gap. He writes: "[M]any students complain that they 
see little or no connection between jurisprudence and the rest of the 
curriculum. Similarly many academic lawyers assert that some de-
bates in legal philosophy or the sociology of law or critical theory have 
become too 'sophisticated' or 'abstruse' for them to understand" (p. 1 ). 
Believing that an understanding of jurisprudence is essential to all 
members of the legal profession, Twining has assembled a collection of 
essays discussing the need for jurisprudential education and the appli-
cation of legal philosophy to specific fields of law.2 
1. William Twining is Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London. 
2. Five of the contributors to Legal Theory and Common Law originally presented their 
essays at the W.G. Hart Workshop on Legal Theory held in London in July 1984. Those authors 
and their essays are: Norman Lewis, Professor of Public Law at the University of Sheffield, 
Public Law and Legal Theory; Neil MacCormick, Regius Professor of the Law of Nature and the 
Law of Nations at the University of Edinburgh, with W. Twining, Theory in the Law Curricu-
lum; David Miers, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College, Cardiff, Legal Theory and the 
Interpretation of Statutes; Katherine O'Donovan, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of 
Kent, Family Law and Legal Theory; and Richard Tur, Benn Law Fellow at Oriel College, 
Oxford, Criminal Law and Legal Theory. These essays were revised slightly for inclusion in this 
book. 
Three of the essays are reprints from previous publications: Karl Llewellyn, A Required 
Course in Jurisprudence; Brian Simpson, Professor of Law at the University of Kent and the 
University of Chicago, The Common Law and Legal Theory; William Twining, Evidence and 
Legal Theory. 
The remaining five essays were written specifically for publication in this book: Hugh Col-
lins, Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford, Contract and Legal Theory; Roger Cotterrell, Reader 
in Legal Theory at Queen Mary College, London, The Law of Property and Legal Theory; Mary 
Stokes, Fellow ofBrasenose College, Oxford, Company Law and Legal Theory; David Sugarman, 
Reader in Law at Middlesex Polytechnic, Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making 
of the Textbook Tradition; Cento Veljanovski, Lecturer in Law and Economics at University 
College London, Legal Theory, Economic Analysis and the Law of Torts. 
All the contributors except the late Karl Llewellyn are associated with universities in Great 
Britain. This hinders only slightly American application of the theories discussed. After all, 
legal theory shares philosophical strains with all western cultures and, of course, American com-
mon law was derived from the English. Also, the contributors often discuss both English and 
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The contributors to this book were given broad rein and Twining 
admits that each essay "deals with what the author thinks to be theo-
retically significant about their subject" (p. 5). The result is essays 
written at varying levels of abstraction. The contributors' economic 
and political philosophies, however, are more consistent. Twining ad-
mits: "[t]here is a discernible pattern, some would say bias, in the list 
of authors: all of them are more or less dissatisfied with the Exposi-
tory Tradition3 in one way or another" (p. 4; footnote added). To be 
more specific, most of the contributors are dissatisfied with the liberal 
tradition of John Stuart Mill4 and the common law.5 This book, then, 
American precedents. There are, however, certain limitations to the book's British origins that 
should be noted. 
First, Twining remarks that the contributors' opinions are, to a certain extent, reactions to 
the new analytical jurists [who] were either largely apolitical or, like Ronald Dworkin .. , 
propounded versions ofliberalism that were unlikely to satisfy either the left or the right in 
Britain in a period of political polarization in which it was becoming less and less convincing 
to claim that law was or could be politically neutral. 
P. 3. Thus, there are undercurrents of British politics in the essays. Some of these undercurrents 
may be unappreciated by or simply inapplicable to American readers. 
Second, the arguments sometimes rely on specific English legal institutions. Norman Lewis' 
essay Public Law and Legal Theory suffers most from this complaint. Lewis writes in his intro· 
ductory paragraph that it is "the 'search for the [British] constitution' which represents the im· 
portant exercise to be conducted" in public law. P. 99 (footnote omitted). Obviously such a 
search would be shortlived in America. This is not to say, however, that the essay is completely 
irrelevant to American jurists; it is just less relevant than the others. Another example is Cento 
Veljanovski's essay Legal Theory, Economic Analysis and the Law of Torts, which is most inter· 
esting as one English scholar's view of the American Law and Economics School. The reasoning 
of this school has been largely ignored by courts in England. 
3. The Expository Tradition, as explained by contributor David Sugarman, embodies the 
theory 
that law may appear chaotic but is, in fact, internally coherent. This cohesion derives from 
the fact that law is grounded upon relatively few general principles. The legal scholar [is] in 
a unique position to tease out the general principles underlying the law and impart this sense 
of cohesion through the teaching of general principles and the systemization of those princi· 
pies in law textbooks .... 
. . . In short, exposition, conceptualization, systematization and the analysis of existing 
legal doctrine became equated with the dominant tasks of legal education and scholarship. 
Pp. 29, 31. 
4. John Stuart Mill was an English philosopher who lived from 1806 to 1873. His theories 
are best summarized in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Go1oer11· 
ment, three of his many essays. Mill was a strong supporter of individual freedom. In On Lib· 
erty he wrote: 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, .• , that the sole end for 
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, 
or even right. ... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to 
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde· 
pendence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign. 
J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRE· 
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 72.73 (H. Acton ed. 1972). Mill's theories, and those from which 
they are derived, embody the philosophy known as "classic liberalism." 
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is somewhat misnamed; its title actually should be Legal Theory and 
Its Potential to Eradicate Common Law. 
Twining begins with two essays attacking the deficiencies of the 
common law. Brian Simpson initiates the assault, arguing against the 
theory that common law represents a positivistic set of rules. Attack-
ing John Austin6 in particular, Simpson writes: 
The notion that the common law consists of rules which are the 
product of a series of acts of legislation (mostly untraceable) by judges 
(most of whose names are forgotten) cannot be made to work, if taken 
seriously, because common law rules enjoy whatever status they possess 
not because of the circumstances of their origin, but because of their 
continued reception. [p. 14] 
Simpson posits rather that the common law is customary law, which is 
derived from common beliefs or practices within a society. As such, 
common law depends on cohesion among its practitioners which no 
longer exists. Thus, Simpson concludes "the common law is more like 
a muddle than a system" (p. 24). He then suggests: 
[T]he only effective technique for reducing the common law to a set of 
rules is codification, coupled of course with a deliberate reduction in the 
status of the judiciary and some sort of ban on law reporting .... [p. 24] 
Simpson's essay is followed by David Sugarman's elaborate histori-
cal account of the development of common law theory and teaching. 
Sugarman, in this book's best contribution from the Critical Legal 
Studies school, decries legal theorists for establishing the formalistic, 
expository tradition of legal education. He posits that English jurists 
of the late nineteenth century established the expository method of 
teaching in a quest for professional legitimacy. Traditionally, lawyers 
had not obtained their training at a university but rather through prac-
tice. The law faculties established during the nineteenth century pro-
moted the theory that there were universalities in law that a 
prospective attorney could learn in the classroom. In doing so, 
Sugarman argues, the jurists artificially narrowed and formalized the 
definition of law. 
Simpson's and Sugarman's essays set the tone for the other con-
tributors: the first order of business for all is to propound a unified but 
5. This is less true of the essays by Cotterrell and Veljanovski. 
6. John Austin was an English jurist who lived from 1790 to 1859. He is credited with 
introducing exactness of thought and expression to legal terms and theories. In doing so, Austin 
attempted to distinguish law from custom and positive law from social norms. He wrote: 
Of all the concise expressions which I have turned in my mind, "the philosophy of posi-
tive law" indicates the most significantly the subject and scope of my Course. . . . Now 
general jurisprudence, or the philosophy of positive law, is not concerned directly with the 
science of legislation. It is concerned directly with principles and distinctions which are 
common to various systems of particular and positive law; and which each of those various 
systems inevitably involves .... [T]he philosophy of positive lawD is concerned with law as it 
necessarily is, rather than with law as it ought to be: with law as it must be, be it good or 
bad, rather than with law as it must be, if it be good. 
1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 33 (R. Campbell ed. 1869) (emphasis in original). 
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broadened theory for their respective areas of law. Some contributors, 
however, assume they write in areas of law that already possess a uni-
fied theory. For these authors Legal Theory and Common Law be-
comes a forum for espousing their particular theories. In the words of 
Austin, some contributors address the question of what law is, at-
tempting to broaden the positive definition, while others address the 
normative question of what the law ought to be. 7 These two ap-
proaches are exemplified by Twining's essay Evidence and Legal The-
ory and Mary Stokes' essay Company Law and Legal Theory. 8 
Twining begins his essay by criticizing the law of evidence for be-
ing too formalistic. He argues that scholarly treatment of the subject 
of evidence is usually limited to discussion of the established rules and 
generally does not adequately address the broader question of how tri-
ers of fact can decide cases about which they have no first-hand knowl-
edge. Twining asserts that "the theorist has a much more important 
role to play in subverting divisions and building intellectual bridges 
than in settling lines of demarcation" (p. 62). He then outlines five 
tasks or areas of investigation for the legal theorist: (1) intellectual 
history; (2) "High Theory" or "the exploration of fundamental general 
questions related to the subject-matter of law as a discipline"; 
(3) "[m]iddle-order theorizing" or "the development of prescriptive 
working theories"; (4) the conduit function, "the relationship between 
law and at least the more general aspects of all other disciplines related 
to law"; and (5) the integrative or synthesizing function described as 
"articulating frames of reference which provide a coherent basis for 
law as a discipline" (p. 64; emphasis in original).9 
Twining follows his categorization with suggestions of fertile areas 
of scholarly investigation and integration within each category. For 
example, in the area of intellectual history Twining criticizes historical 
debates for being limited solely to the consideration of established 
rules and for ignoring developments in psychology, forensic medicine, 
and other sciences. To Twining, these disciplines must inform the sub-
ject of evidence. Similarly, in the area of philosophy he suggests that 
further analysis of the independence of fact from belief may be fruitful. 
The essay continues with a short critique of Bentham's Rationale of 
Judicial Evidence, 10 highlighting areas where Bentham could be mod-
ernized, and concludes with a note cautioning jurists against believing 
that any theory will be stable for all time. Twining believes that in his 
essay he develops "a mapping theory [that] charts relations between 
lines of enquiry and raises questions [as opposed to] a general theory 
7. Id. 
8. Four contributors share Twining's approach (Twining, Cotterrell, Lewis and Veljanovski), 
five share Stokes' (Stokes, Miers, Collins, O'Donovan and Tur). 
9. Twining's categories are referenced by other contributors. 
10. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London 1827). 
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[that] purports to provide answers to such questions" (p. 77). In this 
effort he is generally successful, although one might wonder if his es-
say is not really a revisitation of legal realism. 
In sharp contrast, Mary Stokes attempts to provide no such frame-
work for inquiry but rather proposes a specific theory. She begins by 
asserting that the central preoccupation of corporate law has been to 
legitimize the power of corporate managers. She asserts that previous 
attempts to legitimize this power have failed because they relied on 
liberal 11 theories of competitive markets. This reliance was a "mis-
take" for three reasons, all related to the growth of firms. First, firms 
have become monopolistic or oligopolistic and therefore no longer 
compete in competitive markets. Second, management has become 
separated from ownership, and as a result managers are no longer in-
terested in maximizing the stockholders' investments. Instead, their 
interest in perpetuating their own power eliminates the profit motive 
as the primary criterion for management actions. Finally, economic 
power in large firms is exercised through intrafirm bureaucracies 
rather than as a result of competitive market forces. Stokes then de-
votes thirteen pages to the impossibility of reconciling current corpo-
rate legal practice with its ideological foundations, concluding: "The 
legal model's attempt to equate corporate managers with ordinary en-
trepreneurs acting so as to maximize the profits of the company should 
be recognized for what it is - a failure" (p. 173). 
Stokes proposes the corporatist model of the company12 as the so-
lution to the irreconcilable differences between law and theory that she 
has identified. 
The corporatist view, by perceiving the company as a unit which welds 
together the interests of its participants into a harmonious common pur-
pose defined as the public good, seems to draw on the ideal of commu-
nity and seeks to inject it into an area which the dominant legal ideology 
regulates through contract and hierarchy. [p. 179] 
To Stokes, this "ideal is attractive" (p. 179). As a result, her essay first 
confirms the view that there is a problematic gap between legal theory 
and practice and then proposes a solution that could be just as much 
divorced from practice. Stokes does not discuss the philosophical 
11. That is, classically liberal. See note 4 supra. Liberal economists believe that in a freely 
competitive market, with easy entry to and exit from the market, individual self-interest, usually 
manifested in the desire for personal profit, will drive participants to use resources in the most 
efficient manner. Maximization of individual utility is the desired goal. 
12. Stokes describes the corporatist model as possessing three characteristics: 
(1) It recognizes that "the modern public company has become an organization whose signifi-
cance almost rivals the state." P. 176. 
(2) It supplies "a normative vision of the role of corporate management" so that "[r]eleased 
from the constraints of both shareholders and any market, managers are free to become public 
servants." P. 176. 
(3) It legitimizes the power of corporate managers "because they are seen simply to help formu-
late, articulate and execute the common purpose of shareholders, creditors, employees and the 
community." P. 177. 
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grounds for her theory, its inconsistency with current practice in mod-
ern capitalist societies, nor the complete economic readjustment it 
would require to implement this socialistic view of the manager as a 
public servant. 13 
The final two chapters of Legal Theory and Common Law are de-
voted to the exploration of the need for a separate law school class in 
jurisprudence. Twining and Neil MacCormick assert in their essay 
that legal theory teaches students to abstract, to question assumptions, 
to exploit the inheritance received from previous jurists, and to under-
stand the student's place in relation to history. These skills allow stu-
dents "to integrate their study of law with their knowledge of other 
subjects, with their own first-hand experiences and with their beliefs 
concerning religion, morals, politics and life" (p. 246). Twining then 
closes the book with an essay written by the late Karl Llewellyn. 14 
Llewellyn claims: "Jurisprudence is as big as the Law, and bigger" (p. 
256). He argues that law schools should teach jurisprudence because 
"[t]he relation of a man's life-work to his society and to himself is a 
duty-job for himself to wrestle with, and a duty-job for us to see that 
he wrestles with" (p. 255). 
Such integration of one's profession with one's personal experience 
and philosophy is a laudable goal. Unfortunately, this book adds little 
that is new to that goal's achievement. Legal Theory and Common 
Law posits a very narrow range of acceptable legal theories. The con-
tributors in most cases fail to identify the philosophical underpinnings 
from which their applied theories are derived. Yet identification of 
those underpinnings would seem to be a prerequisite to achieving 
Llewellyn's goals for jurisprudential education. In addition, the con-
tributors' arguments are often more destructive than constructive, 
leaving the reader more dissatisfied with the role of legal theory at the 
end of the book than at the beginning. In the end this book will only 
provide superfluous ammunition to those who already agree with its 
conclusions and serve to frustrate those who don't. 
- Robert R. Morse, Jr. 
13. Stokes' goal is to make corporate management "a purely neutral technocracy, balancing 
a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the 
income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity." P. 176 (quoting A. 
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 312-13 (1967)). 
14. This essay is the text of Llewellyn's contribution to The Round Table on Jurisprudence 
and Legal History at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in 
1939. Twining believes this is the first time the full text of the essay has been published. P. 258. 
